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MIXED MOTIVES AND MOTIVATING FACTORS: CHOOSING A 
REALISTIC SUMMARY JUDGMENT FRAMEWORK FOR 
§ 2000E-2(M) OF TITLE VII 
INTRODUCTION 
Imagine, right now, an employee or job applicant somewhere in the United 
States who has recently experienced discrimination at the hands of an 
employer, at least partly on the basis of race, color, sex, religion, or national 
origin.1  This hypothetical protagonist is reasonably well-informed and decides 
to seek redress in a court of law.  Eventually, the parties reach the stage of 
summary judgment, by which time the plaintiff has elected to proceed under 
the motivating factor (“mixed-motive”) theory created by the Civil Rights Act 
of 1991.2  Further, as in most cases, the plaintiff offers circumstantial (rather 
than direct) evidence to support the claim.3 
When anticipating the employer’s motion for summary judgment, the 
plaintiff’s attorney might believe that her basic task is to show that the plaintiff 
was the object of an adverse employment decision and that the plaintiff’s 
 
 1. Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, these are all protected characteristics 
upon which most employers cannot legally base an adverse employment decision.  See 42 U.S.C. 
§ 2000e-2(a)(1) (2006).  But in reality, our hypothetical employee or job applicant would be just 
one of many people who find or perceive themselves to be the victim of such a decision.  In 2008, 
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) received over 69,000 formal 
complaints under Title VII, though some of the complaints were concurrently filed under other 
antidiscrimination statutes.  THE U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, TITLE 
VII OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT of 1964 CHARGES: FY 1997–FY 2007, available at 
http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/statistics/enforcement/titlevii.cfm. 
 2. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m). 
 3. “Direct evidence of discrimination is evidence that, ‘if believed, proves the existence of 
a fact in issue without inference or presumption.’”  Schoenfeld v. Babbitt, 168 F.3d 1257, 1266 
(11th Cir. 1999) (quoting Burrell v. Bd. of Trs. of Ga. Military Coll., 125 F.3d 1390, 1393 (11th 
Cir. 1997)).  By contrast, circumstantial evidence only suggests a discriminatory motive.  See id.; 
Amrhein v. Health Care Serv. Corp., 546 F.3d 854, 858 (7th Cir. 2008) (quoting Lewis v. Sch. 
Dist. #70, 523 F.3d 730, 742 (7th Cir. 2008) (echoing the Eleventh Circuit’s definition of direct 
evidence and describing circumstantial evidence as that “which allows the trier of fact to infer 
intentional discrimination . . . typically through a longer chain of inferences”)).  Employment 
discrimination complaints based on direct, rather than circumstantial, evidence are comparatively 
rare because “direct evidence of intentional discrimination is hard to come by.”  Price Waterhouse 
v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 271 (1989) (O’Connor, J., concurring), superseded by statute, Civil 
Rights Act of 1991, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m), as recognized in Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 
U.S. 90, 94–95 (2003); see also Kline v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 128 F.3d 337, 348 (6th Cir. 1997). 
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protected characteristic was a “motivating factor” in that decision.4  More 
precisely, to avoid summary judgment under the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure, she would need to show that genuine issues of material fact 
remained with regard to the adverse employment decision and the 
discriminatory motivating factor.5  Yet, in four federal circuits, the attorney 
would be partially wrong.6  In at least five other circuits, the attorney could not 
be sure which framework the court might apply.7 
Notwithstanding the plain language of § 2000e-2(m), the federal appellate 
courts have split over the question of which framework to apply at summary 
judgment to claims brought under § 2000e-2(m), when supported by 
circumstantial evidence.  In the larger context of Title VII litigation, the 
existence of such an inconsistency is perhaps unsurprising.  More than one 
conflict in this fractured area of law has resisted resolution.8  The struggle to 
identify the correct summary judgment framework for a § 2000e-2(m) 
circumstantial evidence claim is only one problem, but it is a particularly 
pressing one.9  Fortunately, this question has at last met a realistic answer, 
embodied in a 2008 decision by the Sixth Circuit.10 
 
 4. See § 2000e-2(m) (“Except as otherwise provided in this subchapter, an unlawful 
employment practice is established when the complaining party demonstrates that race, color, 
religion, sex, or national origin was a motivating factor for any employment practice, even though 
other factors also motivated the practice.”). 
 5. See FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c). 
 6. See discussion infra Parts II, III for a detailed overview of the frameworks utilized by the 
federal circuits. 
 7. The court might not know either.  The First, Second, Third, Seventh, and Tenth Circuits 
have not taken a position on this issue, as noted in White v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 533 F.3d 
381, 399 (6th Cir. 2008). 
 8. See discussion infra Part II.  For example, the circuits were once split over the direct 
evidence requirement described in Part II.  See discussion infra Part II.  The Ninth Circuit 
described the debate over that issue as a “quagmire,” “morass,” and the spawning point for a 
“cottage industry of litigation.”  Costa v. Desert Palace, 299 F.3d 838, 851, 853 (9th Cir. 2002).  
Similarly, the Supreme Court remarked in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins that the mixed-motive 
issue had “to say the least, left the Circuits in disarray.”  Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 
228, 238 n. 2 (1989) (plurality opinion), superseded by statute, Civil Rights Act of 1991, 42 
U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m), as recognized in Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 94–95 (2003). 
 9. Jaclyn Borcherding, Note, Deserting McDonnell Douglas? Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 
57 BAYLOR L. REV. 243, 262 (2005) (“The summary judgment stage is critical because it is 
where most employment discrimination cases are either won or lost.”).  For plaintiffs in 
employment discrimination cases, surviving pretrial adjudication (like a summary judgment 
motion) is a tough battle.  A study in 2004 found that defendants in such cases win over twenty-
two percent of pretrial adjudication in federal courts, compared to just over four percent for 
plaintiffs.  Kevin M. Clermont & Stewart J. Schwab, How Employment Discrimination Plaintiffs 
Fare in Federal Court, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 429, 444 (2004).  Approximately 70% of 
the cases surveyed were brought under Title VII.  Id. 
 10. White, 533 F.3d at 381. 
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Part I of this Comment will provide a brief historical overview of the issue.  
Part II will unravel and critique the frameworks (mainly, the iterations of the 
McDonnell Douglas framework) favored by the circuits.11  Part III will focus 
on the Sixth Circuit’s new “motivating factor” framework and its rationale.  
Part IV will offer additional reasons supporting the Sixth Circuit’s decision, 
based on social-psychological studies of discriminatory behavior. 
I.  TITLE VII TO DESERT PALACE: AN OVERVIEW OF THE MIXED MOTIVE CLAIM 
A. Title VII and Price Waterhouse 
The original legislative foundation for the claim described in this 
Comment’s introduction is Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.  It 
declares unlawful any “employment practice” that “discriminate[s] against any 
individual [ . . . ] because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or 
national origin.”12  In effect, Title VII sought to forbid most intentional 
employment discrimination predicated on any of the protected characteristics 
of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.13  This statute would eventually 
give rise to the framework issue, but not before additional legislation and 
Supreme Court opinions significantly altered the Title VII landscape.14 
 
 11. The author does not purport to review every conceivable summary judgment framework.  
Rather, Part II of the Comment summarizes the distinct approaches taken by the federal circuit 
courts that have recognized and responded to this issue.  See discussion infra Part II.  Readers 
who are also interested in frameworks beyond those adopted by any circuit can find novel 
proposals among the scholarly literature on this topic.  See, e.g., Martin J. Katz, Reclaiming 
McDonnell Douglas, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 109, 166–67 (2007) (advocating for a new 
integration of § 2000e-2(m) and the McDonnell Douglas pretext framework and contending that 
all other approaches to the choice of mixed-motive frameworks “posit a false dichotomy”); 
Jeffrey A. Van Detta, “Le Roi Est Mort; Vive Le Roi!”: An Essay on the Quiet Demise of 
McDonnell Douglas and the Transformation of Every Title VII Case After Desert Palace, Inc. v. 
Costa into a “Mixed-Motives” Case, 52 DRAKE L. REV. 71, 117–19 (2003) (arguing the pretext 
framework is obsolete and re-conceptualizing the motivating factor framework to substitute 
causation for unlawful intent). 
 12. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2006). 
 13. Some employers are exempt.  By its own terms, Title VII does not apply to Indian tribes 
or certain private nonprofit organizations.  42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b).  In addition, an employer may 
sometimes discriminate on the basis of religion, national origin, or sex where these characteristics 
are part of a bona fide occupational qualification (the “BFOQ” exception).  See Dothard v. 
Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 333 (1977) (recognizing the BFOQ exception but describing it as 
“extremely narrow”). 
 14. The most important of these events (the Supreme Court’s decision in Price Waterhouse 
and the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1991) will be discussed in some detail below.  See infra 
notes 15–31 and accompanying text.  For a concise summary, see EQUAL OPPORTUNITY 
EMPLOYMENT COMMISSION, THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1991, http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/ 
history/35th/1990s/civilrights.html (last visited June 8, 2010). 
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In 1989, more than two decades after Title VII’s passage, the Supreme 
Court in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins was called upon to decide whether an 
employer who discriminated against an employee for a mixture of reasons, 
some legal and some illegal, could be held liable for a violation of Title VII.15  
A plurality ruled that a plaintiff could potentially hold an employer liable for 
such mixed-motive discrimination where the unlawful motive (e.g., gender) 
was a factor in the employment decision.16  Justice O’Connor separately 
concurred in judgment but stated that the plaintiff should be obliged to show 
that the unlawful motive was a substantial factor.17  Furthermore, Justice 
O’Connor’s analysis demanded that the plaintiff bring direct evidence of 
discrimination.18 
Two points of special importance emerged from Price Waterhouse.  The 
first is that the case legitimized the mixed-motive analysis, which previously 
had been rejected by some circuits in favor of a more stringent “but-for” 
standard of causation.19  After Price Waterhouse, federal courts would no 
longer treat discrimination as a simple on-or-off proposition.  Rather, 
employers could be held liable for adverse employment decisions fueled by a 
mixture of lawful and unlawful motives, even if the plaintiff did not prove that, 
“but for” the discriminatory motive, the employment decision would have been 
in her favor.20 
Nonetheless, the Court’s ruling gave the employer a sizeable loophole.  
Even after the plaintiff met the burden of production, the employer could 
escape liability by showing it would have taken the same adverse employment 
action in the absence of the unlawful motive.21  If successful, this argument 
was a complete affirmative defense.22 
 
 15. See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 237 (plurality opinion). 
 16. Id. at 240 (“We take [§ 2000e-2(a)(1)] to mean that gender must be irrelevant to 
employment decisions.”). 
 17. Id. at 265 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 18. Id. at 276 (“[I]n order to justify shifting the burden on the issue of causation to the 
defendant, a disparate treatment plaintiff must show by direct evidence that an illegitimate 
criterion was a substantial factor in the decision.”).  Justice O’Connor also referred to direct 
evidence as “strong” evidence.  Id.; see also infra note 69 and supra note 3. 
 19. After the plaintiff establishes the presence of an illegitimate discriminatory factor in an 
employment decision, her case will still fall short of “but-for” causation if the decision 
“nevertheless would have transpired in the same way” even in the absence of that factor.  See 
Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 240.  Before Price Waterhouse, the Third, Fourth, Fifth, and 
Seventh Circuits had nullified mixed-motive claims by requiring the plaintiff to show that the 
employer’s discriminatory intent played a “but-for” role in the adverse employment decision. Id. 
at 238 n.2. 
 20. See id. at 240. 
 21. The plurality and the two concurring justices agreed on this point.  See id. at 244–45, 
261, 276. 
 22. Id. at 246. 
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Consequently, the Court’s plurality and concurring opinions left the 
inveterate element of but-for causation partly intact, because the employer’s 
affirmative defense meant that an unlawful motive could play a part in an 
adverse employment decision as long as it did not control the outcome.23  In 
this sense, Price Waterhouse did little more than fiddle with the burden of 
proof.24  The Court’s ruling signaled that unlawful motives were permissible as 
long as the employer could show that such motives fell short of “but for” 
causation. 
The second point of importance is that, following Price Waterhouse, most 
of the lower courts adopted Justice O’Connor’s direct evidence requirement for 
mixed-motive claims.25  Mixed-motive claims based on circumstantial 
evidence were categorically rejected.  Thus, the lower courts were not yet 
required to choose between or among summary judgment frameworks 
designed for circumstantial evidence,26 such as the pretext framework derived 
from McDonnell Douglas v. Green.27  That fact is significant because it means 
the primary issue confronted in this Comment (the choice of frameworks) lay 
dormant for the time being.  The situation, however, was destined to change 
swiftly. 
 
 23. See id. at 240 (suggesting that the phrase “because of” in § 2000e-2(a)(1) did not mean 
“but-for” causation was part of the plaintiff’s prima facie case, but that the inclusion of the 
employer’s affirmative defense tempered the plurality’s interpretation and made “but-for” 
causation a decisive element of the mixed-motive analysis). 
 24. Rachid v. Jack in the Box, Inc., 376 F.3d 305, 309 (5th Cir. 2004) (“Price Waterhouse 
involves a shift of the burden of persuasion to the defendant.  In other words, under Price 
Waterhouse . . . the burden of proof shifts to the employer to show that the same adverse 
employment decision would have been made regardless of discriminatory animus.”). 
 25. Kristina N. Klein, Note, Oasis or Mirage?  Desert Palace and Its Impact on the Summary 
Judgment Landscape, 33 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1177, 1184 (2006).  Courts treated Justice 
O’Connor’s opinion as controlling because her concurrence was thought—correctly or not—to be 
the narrowest holding.  See Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. ___, 129 S. Ct. 2343, 2357 
(2009) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977)) 
(“[W]hen a fragmented Court decides a case and no single rationale explaining the result enjoys 
the assent of five Justices, ‘the holding of the Court may be viewed as that position taken by those 
Members who concurred in the judgments on the narrowest grounds.’”). 
 26. White v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 533 F.3d 381, 397 (6th Cir. 2008) (“As mixed-motive 
plaintiffs were not allowed to demonstrate their claims through circumstantial evidence, these 
courts [prior to Desert Palace] did not even consider whether such plaintiffs should be required to 
satisfy the McDonnell Douglas/Burdine burden shifting framework in order to [survive summary 
judgment].”).  In other words, courts did not have to choose between McDonnell Douglas (a 
framework designed earlier for single-motive claims based on circumstantial evidence) and 
competing frameworks (such as the motivating factor framework crafted by the Sixth Circuit) for 
mixed-motive claims until after Desert Palace. 
 27. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 804–05 (1973).  For a more detailed 
explanation of McDonnell Douglas (both the case and the eponymous framework), see infra notes 
40–48 and accompanying text. 
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B. The Civil Rights Act of 1991 
Displeased by Price Waterhouse, Congress passed the Civil Rights Act of 
1991 to supersede the Supreme Court’s decision.28  In a portion later codified 
as 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m), the Act pronounced, “Except as otherwise 
provided in this subchapter, an unlawful employment practice is established 
when the complaining party demonstrates that race, color, religion, sex, or 
national origin was a motivating factor for any employment practice, even 
though other factors also motivated the practice.”29  The “motivating factor” 
language partially dispensed with the Price Waterhouse affirmative defense 
and would eventually form the basis of a distinctive “motivating factor” 
framework. 30 
Part of the affirmative defense survived.  Even after the plaintiff 
established an illegitimate motive, the Act blocked most forms of monetary 
relief to the plaintiff (except attorney’s fees and costs) if the employer could 
carry the burden of establishing that the illegitimate motive was not a “but for” 
factor in the adverse employment decision.31 
C. Desert Palace: The Supreme Court Speaks? 
In 2003, the Supreme Court analyzed § 2000e-2(m) in its review of a Ninth 
Circuit case, Costa v. Desert Palace.32  The Ninth Circuit had affirmed the 
grant of a mixed-motive jury instruction for a claim supported by 
 
 28. 42 U.S.C § 2000e-2(m) (2000).  “The inevitable effect of the Price Waterhouse decision 
is to permit prohibited employment discrimination to escape sanction under Title VII . . . .  
Legislation is needed to restore Title VII’s comprehensive ban on all impermissible consideration 
of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin in employment.”  H.R. Doc. No. 102-40(I), at 46, 
47–48 (1991),  reprinted in Civil Rights Act of 1991, 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 549, 584, 585–86.  The 
Supreme Court has since declined to apply Price Waterhouse in other contexts.  See Gross v. FBL 
Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. ____, 129 S. Ct. 2343, 2352 (2009) (“Thus, even if Price Waterhouse 
was doctrinally sound, the problems associated with its application have eliminated any 
perceivable benefit to extending its framework to ADEA claims.”). 
 29. § 2000e-2(m). 
 30. Regarding the affirmative defense, see supra notes 19–24 and accompanying text.  The 
motivating factor language features prominently in the Sixth Circuit’s framework.  See infra Part 
III. 
 31. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) (2006).  “[If] an individual proves a violation under § 
2000e-2(m) of this title and a respondent demonstrates that the respondent would have taken the 
same action in the absence of the impermissible motivating factor, the court—(i) may grant 
declaratory relief, injunctive relief (except as provided in clause (ii)), and attorney’s fees and 
costs . . . and (ii) shall not award damages or issue an order requiring any admission, 
reinstatement, hiring, promotion, or payment . . . .”  Id. 
 32. Desert Palace, Inc., v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 101 (2003).  At the Ninth Circuit level, the 
case was Costa v. Desert Palace, Inc., 299 F.3d 838 (9th Cir. 2002) (en banc). 
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circumstantial evidence.33  The Ninth Circuit’s ruling was notable for Title VII 
litigants because it addressed an unresolved question: whether the trend 
towards demanding direct (and not merely circumstantial) evidence for mixed-
motive claims had survived the Civil Rights Act of 1991.34 
After discussing the legislative history of § 2000e-2(m), the Supreme 
Court affirmed the Ninth Circuit’s ruling and held that plaintiffs could rely on 
circumstantial evidence to support a mixed-motive claim under § 2000e-
2(m).35  Departing from her position in Price Waterhouse, Justice O’Connor 
concurred and endorsed the use of circumstantial evidence, expressly 
attributing her changed position to the legislative intent behind § 2000e-2(m).36  
The Court’s ruling abrogated the demand for direct evidence previously 
imposed upon plaintiffs by several of the federal circuits, which were 
following Justice O’Connor’s prior concurrence in Price Waterhouse.37 
As momentous as such a ruling may seem, Desert Palace focused on jury 
instructions, not summary judgment frameworks, and some courts have found 
this distinction meaningful.38  Yet, even if one is reluctant to accept that Desert 
Palace represents a paradigm shift for summary judgment frameworks in 
mixed-motive cases, one must credit Desert Palace with making the present 
debate possible.  Because the Court validated § 2000e-2(m) claims based on 
circumstantial evidence, plaintiffs and defendants (not to mention scholars, law 
students, and circuit courts) would have the chance to argue over which 
circumstantial-evidence framework to apply at summary judgment.39  The next 
section discusses the framework most circuits have applied in some form or 
another—the “McDonnell Douglas” framework. 
 
 33. Costa, 299 F.3d at 865.  The court remanded the case on an issue related to punitive 
damages.  Id. 
 34. Desert Palace, Inc., 539 U.S. at 95. 
 35. Id. at 101–02 (“[D]irect evidence of discrimination is not required in mixed-motive  
cases . . . .”). 
 36.  Id. at 102 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“I join the Court’s opinion. . . .  [I]n the Civil 
Rights Act of 1991, Congress codified a new evidentiary rule for mixed-motive cases arising 
under Title VII.”). 
 37. See Klein, supra note 25, at 1184. 
 38. The Court’s majority opinion in Desert Palace begins its analysis by stating, “This case 
provides us with the first opportunity to consider the effects of the 1991 [Civil Rights] Act on 
jury instructions in mixed-motive cases.”  Desert Palace, Inc., 539 U.S. at 98 (emphasis added).  
The Eighth Circuit would later seize upon this point in Griffith v. City of Des Moines, 387 F.3d 
733, 736 (8th Cir. 2004), to support its argument that the ramifications of Desert Palace did not 
extend to summary judgment.  For further development of this point, see infra note 66 and 
accompanying text. 
 39. See supra note 26 and accompanying text. 
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D. A Step Backwards: McDonnell Douglas and Burdine 
Given the chronological progression of the above topics, this subsection’s 
location may seem incongruous.  Both the cases to be discussed here 
(McDonnell Douglas v. Green from 1973 and Texas Department of Community 
Affairs v. Burdine from 1980)  predate all of the case law and legislation 
discussed so far, with the exception of Title VII itself.40  The reason is simple: 
it was only after Desert Palace that the framework from McDonnell Douglas 
grew popular in the Title VII context. 
Claims of illegal discrimination based on circumstantial evidence were 
traditionally subject to the three-step burden-shifting framework established in 
McDonnell Douglas v. Green.41 The McDonnell Douglas “pretext” framework 
consists of three burden-shifting steps.42 First, the plaintiff must establish a 
prima facie case for intentional discrimination; second, the defendant may 
offer a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse employment 
decision in question; third, the plaintiff must show any proffered legitimate 
reason to be pretextual.43  The prima facie case is further broken down into 
several components.44 
In 1980, seven years after the Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas 
enumerated and described each of the burden-shifting steps, the Court in 
Burdine added that the ultimate burden of proving intentional discrimination 
always rested with the plaintiff and was never transferred to the defendant.45  
The Court also remarked that the burden-shifting process is designed “to bring 
the litigants and the court expeditiously and fairly to this ultimate question [of 
 
 40. See supra notes 12, 15, 28, 32 and accompanying text. 
 41. See Van Detta, supra note 11, at 132 (describing the “classic circumstantial evidence 
case” as “the kind to which courts since 1973 routinely applied a McDonnell Douglas analysis”). 
 42. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802, 804 (1973). 
 43. Id. 
 44. The prima facie case requires the plaintiff demonstrate that: (1) the plaintiff is a member 
of a protected group; (2) the plaintiff applied for a job for which the employer was hiring and for 
which the plaintiff was qualified; (3) notwithstanding the plaintiff’s qualifications, the employer 
rejected the plaintiff; and (4) the position afterwards remained open.  See id. at 802. 
 45. See Texas Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1980).  Below, the 
Fifth Circuit had held that the defendant was obligated to establish a legitimate reason for its 
employment decision by a preponderance of the evidence.  See id. at 252.  Even after Burdine, 
courts were divided over the pretext stage.  See Kenneth R. Davis, The Stumbling Three-Step, 
Burden-Shifting Approach in Employment Discrimination Cases, 61 BROOK. L. REV. 703, 714–
16, 718 (1995) (describing how courts split into at least three camps over Burdine and explaining 
how the Supreme Court partially clarified Burdine in St. Mary’s Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 
502 (1993)). 
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intentional discrimination].”46  It is supposed to do so by “[eliminating] the 
most common nondiscriminatory reasons for the plaintiff’s rejection.”47 
In the present, scholarly discourse still ranges broadly over the merits and 
defects of McDonnell Douglas.48  For the most part this Comment does not 
enter that general debate.  To the extent that McDonnell Douglas competes 
with other frameworks in the context of § 2000e-2(m), Parts II and III of this 
Comment do subject it to a limited critique. 
II.  POST-PALACE: THE CIRCUITS DIVERGE 
A. The Fifth Circuit: Modifying McDonnell Douglas 
In 2004, the Fifth Circuit set forth its position on the framework issue in 
Rachid v. Jack in the Box, Inc., where the court ruled that the mixed-motive 
analyses found in Desert Palace and Price Waterhouse were applicable to a 
claim under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA).49  Yet, 
rather than falling back on the classic McDonnell Douglas test, the Fifth 
Circuit forged a hybrid framework, a “modified McDonnell Douglas 
approach,” for its summary judgment framework in mixed motive cases.50  
Like McDonnell Douglas, this test had three steps.51  The first two were 
identical to McDonnell Douglas in every way, but in the final step the court 
held that “the plaintiff must . . . offer sufficient evidence to create a genuine 
issue of material fact either (1) that the defendant’s reason is not true, but is 
instead a pretext for discrimination (pretext alternative) or (2) that the 
 
 46. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253. 
 47. Id. at 254.  That observation may seem innocuous for the moment, but it is one major 
reason that McDonnell Douglas is arguably ill-suited for summary judgment motions in § 2000e-
2(m) cases.  This point is pursued—and perhaps even belabored—in due course.  See infra notes 
55–63, 74–80, and accompanying text. 
 48. For an evidentiary framework, McDonnell Douglas arouses singularly impassioned 
arguments from its detractors and supporters.  See, e.g., Matthew R. Scott & Russell D. Chapman, 
Much Ado About Nothing—Why Desert Palace Neither Murdered McDonnell Douglas nor 
Transformed All Employment Discrimination Cases to Mixed-Motive, 36 ST. MARY’S L.J. 395, 
404 (2005) (levying charges of legal “heresy” against certain critics of McDonnell Douglas); 
Jeffrey A. Van Detta, Requiem for a Heavyweight: Costa as a Countermonument to McDonnell 
Douglas—A Countermemory Reply to Instrumentalism, 67 ALB. L. REV. 965, 967–68 (2004) 
(attributing support for McDonnell Douglas in part to “historical denial”). 
 49. Rachid v. Jack in the Box, Inc., 376 F.3d 305, 311 (5th Cir. 2004) (noting that the “core 
sections” of the ADEA and Title VII are almost identical).  For purposes of summary judgment 
analyses, the court in Rachid treated the ADEA and Title VII as practically interchangeable.  See 
id. 
 50. Id. at 312. 
 51. Id. 
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defendant’s reason, while true, is only one of the reasons for its conduct, and 
another ‘motivating factor’ is the plaintiff’s protected characteristic.”52 
The Rachid court devoted part of its rationale to explaining why it applied 
Desert Palace (a Title VII case) to an ADEA claim.53  It spared relatively little 
attention to explaining why a modified McDonnell Douglas test was the best 
summary judgment framework, much less how Desert Palace could have 
mandated such an outcome.54  The court’s omission has not escaped the notice 
of other courts and commentators.55 
First, McDonnell Douglas was originally intended to smoke out a single 
illegitimate motive, and thus by original design it overlooks the mixed-motive 
concept altogether.56  One could argue, ipso facto, that courts should not use 
McDonnell Douglas in mixed-motive cases.57  In reply to that point, some 
commentators have argued that McDonnell Douglas’s original purpose does 
not preclude it from also serving in a more flexible, mixed-motive role, 
especially when modified to take § 2000e-2(m) into account.58  Yet, while a 
showing of pretext (the third step) is optional under the Fifth Circuit approach, 
the plaintiff’s prima facie case remains mandatory.59  The defendant’s task of 
proffering a legitimate reason for the adverse employment decision also 
endures.60  For the most part, then, any merits or defects from the first two 
steps of the original McDonnell Douglas framework must survive the 
transition to the modified framework.  At least two specific problems are 
identifiable. 
First, the Fifth Circuit’s retention of the prima facie case in mixed-motive 
claims is simply unnecessary.  After all, the mixed-motive prong in the Fifth 
Circuit’s third step ignores the defendant’s offer of a legitimate motive in the 
second-step.61  The first two steps of McDonnell Douglas’s burden-shifting 
become duplicative.  A plaintiff who proceeds on a mixed-motive theory under 
§ 2000e-2(m) should have no need for a multi-step, burden-shifting procedure.  
Instead, to survive summary judgment, the plaintiff should only have to bring 
 
 52. Id. (quoting Rishel v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 297 F. Supp. 2d 854, 865 (M.D.N.C. 
2003). 
 53. See id. at 310–12. 
 54. Rachid, 376 F.3d at 310–12. 
 55. The Sixth Circuit included Rachid among the opinions it criticized for being made 
“without much, if any, consideration of the issue.”  White v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 533 F.3d 
381, 398 (6th Cir. 2008). 
 56. See id. at 400–01. 
 57. See id. 
 58. See Klein, supra note 25, at 1196.  In dicta, the Supreme Court has pointed out that 
McDonnell Douglas “was never intended to be rigid, mechanized, or ritualistic.”  Furnco Constr. 
Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 577 (1978). 
 59. Rachid, 376 F.3d at 312. 
 60. Id. 
 61. See id. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2010] MIXED MOTIVES AND MOTIVATING FACTORS 1449 
evidence that unlawful discrimination was a motivating factor, as plainly stated 
in § 2000e-2(m) itself. 
An even more robust criticism of the Fifth Circuit’s prima facie case is that 
it may actually prevent some plaintiffs from moving forward on a mixed-
motive theory, even when the facts indicate the employer was truly motivated 
in part by illegal discriminatory intent.62  The whole point of completing the 
first step of the burden-shifting scheme is to eliminate the “most common 
nondiscriminatory reasons” for the employer’s decision.63  Thus, under 
McDonnell Douglas (original or modified), a failure to eliminate these reasons 
would justify granting summary judgment to the defendant.  Yet, under 
§ 2000e-2(m), a plaintiff building a prima facie case should only be tasked 
with showing that a discriminatory animus was a motivating factor, without 
regard for whether other reasons played a part in the employer’s decision.64  
Once the plaintiff carries this burden, evidence of additional, 
nondiscriminatory reasons should never justify summary judgment, because 
even if the employer established the partial affirmative defense permitted by 
statute, “the questions of injunctive or declaratory relief and attorney fees and 
costs still remain.”65 
Lest this concern appear entirely theoretical, it should be noted that the 
early results of Rachid are rather discouraging for plaintiffs in the Fifth Circuit.  
Scholars have noted that “a search of Fifth Circuit decisions that cited Rachid 
and actually applied its mixed-motive analysis reveals two decisions in which 
the Fifth Circuit reversed a district court grant of summary judgment and 
twenty-one decisions in which the Fifth Circuit affirmed such grants of 
summary judgment.”66  The concern that the Fifth Circuit’s hybrid framework 
pays only lip service to § 2000e-2(m) has some basis in fact and may be 
confirmed as courts decide more cases under the modified framework. 
B. The Eighth and Eleventh Circuits: Pure McDonnell Douglas 
Following the Civil Rights Act of 1991 and Desert Palace, the Eighth and 
Eleventh Circuits have concluded that Desert Palace did not alter the choice of 
summary judgment frameworks in mixed-motive cases.  In 2004, the Eighth 
Circuit applied McDonnell Douglas when it affirmed a grant of summary 
 
 62. Wright v. Murray Guard, 455 F.3d 702, 717 (6th Cir. 2006). 
 63. Texas Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 254 (1981). 
 64. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (2006). 
 65. Wright, 455 F.3d at 717.  Naturally, the plaintiff would prefer to rebut evidence of 
nondiscriminatory motivations brought by the employer, to prevent the employer from 
establishing its partial affirmative defense.  See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B).  This defense, of 
course, limits the range of remedies available to the plaintiff.  See id.  To review the elements of 
the defense, see supra note 31. 
 66. Robert M. Weems, Selected Issues and Trends in Civil Litigation in Mississippi Federal 
District Courts, 77 MISS. L.J. 977, 1032 (2008) (internal citation omitted). 
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judgment to an employer–defendant in Griffith v. City of Des Moines, a mixed-
motive case.67  The plaintiff in Griffith argued the court should use a modified 
McDonnell Douglas framework.68  Yet, because the Supreme Court’s Desert 
Palace decision only analyzed a mixed-motive jury instruction issue, the 
Eighth Circuit decided that Desert Palace was “an inherently unreliable basis 
for district courts to begin ignoring this Circuit’s controlling summary 
judgment precedents,” which had relied exclusively on McDonnell Douglas for 
circumstantial mixed-motive claims.69 
The Eighth Circuit also placed considerable emphasis on the Supreme 
Court’s choice to apply McDonnell Douglas in a post-Desert Palace case.70  
Because the Supreme Court evidently did not intend Desert Palace to 
terminate McDonnell Douglas entirely, the Eighth Circuit assumed Desert 
Palace was not meant to alter the application of McDonnell Douglas at all.71  
Thus, the Eighth Circuit continues to distinguish claims based on 
circumstantial evidence from claims based on direct evidence.  Only after 
producing direct evidence can a mixed-motive plaintiff sidestep McDonnell 
Douglas in the Eighth Circuit.72 
 
 67. Griffith v. City of Des Moines, 387 F.3d 733, 735 (8th Cir. 2004). 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id.  The Supreme Court did not expressly address McDonnell Douglas in Desert Palace.  
See Klein, supra note 25, at 1088 (“[I]f Desert Palace significantly changed the Title VII 
landscape, then surely the Supreme Court would have at least cited McDonnell Douglas in its 
decision.”). 
 70. Griffith, 387 F.3d at 735.  For the post-Desert Palace case relied upon by the Eighth 
Circuit, see Raytheon Co. v. Hernandez, 540 U.S. 44, 50 n.3 (2003).  The plaintiff in this case 
brought a claim of employment discrimination under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 
not Title VII.  Id. at 49. Interpretations of Title VII and other antidiscrimination statutes are 
sometimes interchangeable.  See Rachid v. Jack in the Box, Inc., 376 F.3d 305, 311 (5th Cir. 
2004).  But the impact of Raytheon on § 2000e-2(m) is doubtful because the ADA contains no 
provision equivalent to the motivating factor standard in § 2000e-2(m).  See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111–
17 (forbidding discrimination only “because of” a disability).  For an argument urging courts to 
adapt the motivating factor standard for use under the ADA, see Seam Park, Curing Causation: 
Justifying a “Motivating-Factor” Standard under the ADA, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 257, 277–78 
(2004).  In mid-2009, the Supreme Court reviewed a similar issue for the Age Discrimination in 
Employment Act (ADEA) but found that the ADEA does not authorize mixed-motive age-
discrimination claims.  See Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. ____, 129 S. Ct. 2343, 2350 
(2009). 
 71. Griffith, 387 F.3d at 735–36.  
 72. Id. at 736 (defining direct evidence as “evidence showing a specific link between the 
alleged discriminatory animus and the challenged decision” and “evidence that clearly points to 
the presence of an illegal motive”) (internal citation omitted).  It is clear that the Eighth Circuit’s 
notion of “direct evidence” incorporates a heightened evidentiary standard.  See Id. at 736 
(describing direct evidence as “strong” evidence and explaining that “‘direct’ refers to the causal 
strength of the proof”).  For more general remarks on direct evidence, see supra notes 3 & 18 and 
accompanying text. 
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The Eleventh Circuit, too, has apparently retained McDonnell Douglas as 
its sole Title VII summary judgment framework for claims based on 
circumstantial evidence.  In the 2004 case Burstein v. Emtel, the Eleventh 
Circuit effectively joined the Eighth Circuit’s position, albeit with a more 
subdued tone.73  An unpublished opinion, Burstein never acknowledged Desert 
Palace or the ongoing debate over summary judgment frameworks.  Instead, 
the court simply noted, “In cases involving circumstantial evidence of 
discrimination . . . under Title VII . . . courts use the analytical framework set 
forth in McDonnell Douglas v. Green . . . which requires the plaintiff first to 
demonstrate a prima facie case of discrimination or retaliation.”74 
In the preceding year, the Eleventh Circuit had grappled with Desert 
Palace more directly in Cooper v. Southern Company and emerged with a 
relatively clear allegiance to McDonnell Douglas.75  Yet, Cooper was not a 
mixed-motive case.  The court underscores this fact but dodges the question of 
whether it would have used McDonnell Douglas at summary judgment if the 
Cooper plaintiff had expressly relied on a mixed-motive theory rather than a 
single-motive theory.76 
The central criticism levied at the Eight and Eleventh Circuits is that the 
courts blatantly misconstrue Desert Palace by ignoring the obvious 
implications of the Supreme Court’s reasoning in that case.  The Court 
repeatedly stated that a mixed-motive theory imposes no special or heightened 
evidentiary requirement, as compared to the requirements of single-motive 
theory.77  Yet, the burden on a plaintiff under McDonnell Douglas is higher 
than under a simple motivating factor framework, because McDonnell Douglas 
requires plaintiffs to not only eliminate nondiscriminatory reasons for the 
employment decision, but to also present evidence of a discriminatory 
reason.78  Consequently, by applying McDonnell Douglas to claims brought 
under § 2000e-2(m), the Eighth and Eleventh Circuits are applying a 
 
 73. Burstein v. Emtel, Inc., No. 04-12841, 2005 WL 1370122, at *208 (11th Cir. June 8, 
2005). 
 74. Id.  A footnote in the opinion also discusses the plaintiff’s failure to bring “direct” 
evidence of discrimination, which is a meaningful requirement only if the court was in accord 
with the Eighth Circuit.  Id. at 208 n.6. 
 75. See Cooper v. Southern Co., 390 F.3d 695, 725 (11th Cir. 2004). 
 76. See id. at 725 n.17.  Like the Eighth Circuit, the court also points to the lack of attention 
McDonnell Douglas received in Desert Palace.  Id. 
 77. See Desert Palace v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 98, 101 (2003).  As one commentator put it, 
“Desert Palace is not merely a ‘jury instruction’ case . . . but, rather, [it] establishes an entirely 
new avenue for plaintiffs to circumstantially prove a case of discrimination using a mixed-motive 
analysis.”  Weems, supra note 66, at 1029. 
 78. One Sixth Circuit judge used this line of reasoning when he described the McDonnell 
Douglas framework as “more stringent” than a simple motivating factor framework.  White v. 
Baxter Healthcare Corp., 533 F.3d 381, 411 (6th Cir. 2008) (Gilman, J., concurring). 
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heightened evidentiary standard contrary to the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Desert Palace.79 
A brief hypothetical illustrates the effect of this stance.  If a plaintiff brings 
a mixed-motive theory based on circumstantial evidence in one of these two 
circuits, he or she is automatically subjected to McDonnell Douglas when the 
defendant files a motion for summary judgment.80  If the plaintiff can establish 
a prima facie case, the defendant will then proffer a legitimate reason and 
argue that this reason would have led to the same decision in the absence of the 
alleged discriminatory motive.81  At the third stage, the plaintiff is forced to 
rebut the employer’s proffered reason—i.e., expose it as pretext—even though 
the Civil Rights Act of 1991 ostensibly guarantees the plaintiff some measure 
of relief whether or not the employer’s proffered reason is pretextual.82  If 
unable to show pretext, the plaintiff is completely cut off from statutory relief 
by this arbitrary evidentiary scheme.83 
C. The Fourth, Ninth, and D.C. Circuits: Motivating Factor or McDonnell 
Douglas 
The following subsections describe the developments in the Fourth, Ninth, 
and D.C. Circuits, using the Fourth Circuit’s analysis as the primary 
illustration of their shared standards. In McGinest v. GTE Service Corp. 
(2002)84 and Fogg v. Gonzales (2007),85 the Ninth Circuit and D.C. Circuit, 
respectively, have taken positions practically identical to the one set forth by 
the Fourth Circuit. 
 
 79. See Desert Palace, 539 U.S. at 98–99. 
 80. See, e.g., Griffith v. City of Des Moines, 387 F.3d 733, 736 (8th Cir. 2004). 
 81. To review the basic McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting process, see supra notes 40–48 
and accompanying text. 
 82. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m); § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) (2006). 
 83. “[T]he approach of the Eighth and Eleventh circuits will almost inevitably prevent 
plaintiffs in those circuits from exercising the circumstantial mixed-motive option which the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Desert Palace provided to them.”  Weems, supra note 66, at 1030.  
“The [McDonnell Douglas] burden-shifting approach, in theory if not in practice, is frequently 
inconsistent with the Civil Rights Act of 1991.”  Davis, supra note 45, at 745. 
 84. As the Ninth Circuit concluded, “[W]hen responding to a summary judgment motion, the 
plaintiff is presented with a choice regarding how to establish his or her case.  [The plaintiff] may 
proceed by using the McDonnell Douglas framework, or alternatively, may simply produce direct 
or circumstantial evidence demonstrating that a discriminatory reason more likely than not 
motivated [the defendant-employer].”  McGinest v. GTE Serv. Corp., 360 F.3d 1103, 1122 (9th 
Cir. 2002). 
 85. Fogg v. Gonzales, 492 F.3d 447, 451 (D.C. Cir. 2007).  The D.C. Circuit departs 
superficially from its sister circuits when it refers to the motivating factor test as a “motivating 
part” or “substantial factor” test.  Id.  While the latter term smacks of a heightened evidentiary 
standard, the Fogg court later adheres to the plain “motivating factor” language from § 2000e-
2(m).  See id. at 453. 
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As exemplified in Diamond v. Colonial Life & Accident Insurance Co., the 
Fourth Circuit permits § 2000e-2(m) plaintiffs a choice: at summary judgment, 
they may proceed either by surviving McDonnell Douglas or by presenting 
evidence sufficient to raise genuine issues of material fact over whether the 
defendant’s adverse employment decision was motivated, at least in part, by an 
illegitimate discriminatory factor.86  Plaintiffs do not have to meet a heightened 
evidentiary standard of the sort seen in the Eighth Circuit.  Rather, plaintiffs 
“can survive a motion for summary judgment by presenting direct or 
circumstantial evidence that raises a genuine issue of material fact as to 
whether an impermissible factor such as race motivated the employer’s adverse 
employment decision.”87 
While likely preferable to the alternatives available in the Eighth or Fifth 
Circuits, the open choice between McDonnell Douglas and a motivating factor 
framework is perhaps an unnecessary one.  Given that McDonnell Douglas 
places a greater burden on plaintiffs, informed plaintiffs should consistently 
select a motivating factor framework.88  Yet, if nothing else, retaining an open-
minded position has kept the above circuits somewhat clear of the fray.89  It is 
difficult to criticize such a flexible framework. 
Still, one potential criticism of these circuits’ laissez-faire approach is that 
it creates confusion, because plaintiffs are not clearly directed to choose 
between a mixed-motive and single-motive theory before summary judgment.  
From the D.C. Circuit, Fogg v. Gonzales90 provides a specific example in 
which the plaintiff’s indecision stymied the lower court.91  After the defendant 
filed a motion for judgment as a matter of law, the judge finally settled upon a 
single-motive theory, with McDonnell Douglas as the accompanying 
 
 86. This standard is found in Fogg, 492 F.3d at 454; Diamond v. Colonial Life & Ins. Co., 
416 F.3d 310, 318 (4th Cir. 2005); McGinest, 360 F.3d at 1122. 
 87. Diamond, 416 F.3d at 318. 
 88. See supra note 75 and accompanying text. 
 89. Judge Moore’s concurring opinion in Wright dismissed the Fifth Circuit, excoriated the 
Eighth and Eleventh Circuits, but only implicitly disagreed with the Fourth, Ninth, and D.C. 
circuits by advising the Sixth Circuit to exclude McDonnell Douglas from mixed-motive claims.  
See Wright v. Murray Guard, 455 F.3d 702, 717–20 (6th Cir. 2006) (Moore, J., concurring).  The 
author has found no courts and few commentators who focus direct criticism on the Fourth, 
Ninth, or D.C. circuits.  But see Katz, supra note 11, at 164–66 (repudiating the “choice” camp 
and situating the pretext and motivating factor frameworks to serve complementary, rather than 
competing, roles in mixed motive claims). 
 90. Fogg, 492 F.3d at 451. 
 91. See Borcherding, supra note 9, at 263 (noting that the standard for determining whether 
a plaintiff should survive a motion for judgment as a matter of law is “the same as the standard 
for defeating a motion for summary judgment . . . .”) (quoting Dunbar v. Pepsi-Cola Gen. 
Bottlers, Inc., 285 F. Supp. 2d 1180, 1195 (N.D. Iowa 2003); see also Anderson v. Liberty 
Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). 
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framework, merely because the defendant’s motion mentioned pretext.92  
Ironically, the defendant did not wish the trial court to use a pretext framework 
and argued on appeal in favor of eliminating the distinction between mixed-
motive and single-motive frameworks.93  Although the D.C. Circuit reversed 
portions of the lower court’s ruling, it found no abuse of discretion in the trial 
judge’s selection of a theory for the parties based on the defendant’s chance 
mention of pretext.94 
Admittedly, the questions of who chooses how to classify the complaint 
(i.e., as proceeding under § 2000e-2(m) or under a single-motive theory) and 
when that choice must be made are not entirely unique to these circuits.  Their 
approach merely seems to invite the most confusion over choice and timing.95  
To ameliorate the problem, these circuits could at least make one framework 
the default standard for cases where the plaintiff’s choice is unclear.96 
A second potential criticism originates from those commentators who 
consider McDonnell Douglas either entirely “superfluous”97 in light of the 
motivating factor test or “dead”98 in the wake of Desert Palace.  They would 
prefer these circuits to do away with McDonnell Douglas altogether and leave 
plaintiffs with the motivating factor framework for both single and mixed-
motive theories.  Yet, that position is probably too extreme, given that the 
 
 92. Fogg, 492 F.3d at 451.  The oddity in this case arises from the fact  that plaintiffs should 
choose the theory, as the opinion itself seems to recognize. See id. at 451 (explaining that “[u]sing 
the mixed-motive theory, a plaintiff can establish an unlawful employment practice . . . .”) 
(emphasis added). 
 93. Id. at 452–53. 
 94. Id. at 454. 
 95. By contrast, in the Eighth and Eleventh Circuits, the choice of theories and the timing of 
that choice are irrelevant, because the courts there apply a traditional pretext framework to all 
Title VII claims based on circumstantial evidence, regardless of whether the claims are brought 
pursuant to § 2000e-2(m) or Title VII’s general antidiscrimination provision, § 2000e-2(a)(1).  
See supra notes 64–73 and accompanying text.  Somewhat similarly, a Fifth Circuit plaintiff 
theoretically ought to be able to proceed under § 2000e-2(m) by default, and so a judge would 
never be left with the awkward task of gleaning the plaintiff’s theory from the parties’ briefs.  See 
supra notes 49–52 and accompanying text.  The Sixth Circuit’s approach may raise some 
questions in this area.  See infra Part III. 
 96. Ideally, the default standard would be the motivating factor framework, whose 
advantages over the pretext framework are a central point of discussion in this article.  See infra 
notes 127–40 and accompanying text.  If a plaintiff did not prefer the default framework, the 
plaintiff could make that clear through the same means by which the plaintiff identifies the 
complaint as proceeding on a mixed or single-motive theory.  See infra notes 148–49 and 
accompanying text. 
 97. Davis, supra note 45, at 752. 
 98. Van Detta, supra note 48, at 966.  One district court has adopted this expansive view, at 
least with regard to Title VII.  See Dare v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 267 F. Supp. 2d 987, 991–92 
(D. Minn. 2003) (finding that McDonnell Douglas no longer applied to single or mixed-motive 
theories after Desert Palace). 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2010] MIXED MOTIVES AND MOTIVATING FACTORS 1455 
Supreme Court continues to make use of McDonnell Douglas in some contexts 
after Desert Palace.99 
As the Supreme Court had cautioned, Desert Palace did not require the 
Court to decide if the motivating factor test applied outside the mixed-motive 
context.100  With that question undecided, the motivating factor framework is 
probably not yet ready to supplant McDonnell Douglas in every Title VII 
claim.  A more modest argument is that within the mixed-motive context, a 
simple “motivating factor” framework should replace McDonnell Douglas.  
That is precisely the stance taken by the Sixth Circuit, as explained in the 
following section. 
III.  THE SIXTH CIRCUIT TAKES A STAND: THE MOTIVATING FACTOR 
FRAMEWORK 
A. Pre-White: Evading the Issue 
For a few years following Desert Palace, the Sixth Circuit managed to 
avoid the prickly question of how to unravel Desert Palace’s abolishment of 
the distinction between direct and circumstantial evidence, for purposes of 
evaluating mixed-motive claims.  In 2005, one unpublished opinion 
acknowledged the issue but refused to resolve it.101  Another unpublished 
opinion from the same year suggested that a modified pretext framework, 
similar to the Fifth Circuit’s hybrid, would be the best choice.102 
Later still, in the 2006 case Wright v. Murray Guard, Inc., the majority 
opinion noted that Desert Palace presented an unresolved question regarding 
summary judgment frameworks and circumstantial mixed-motive claims.103  
Unfortunately, the majority opinion avoided settling the question of Desert 
Palace’s impact on the choice of frameworks.104  The court clearly averred that 
it was simply persisting in the same analysis it would have used for a mixed-
motive claim supported by direct evidence before Desert Palace.105  It did not 
decide whether mixed-motive theories supported by circumstantial evidence 
ought to be analyzed with a pretext framework, as discrimination claims 
supported by circumstantial evidence traditionally were.106 
The more helpful analysis in Wright originates in the concurring opinion 
by Judge Moore (who also authored the majority opinion).107  Not only did her 
 
 99. See supra note 67 and accompanying text. 
 100. Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 94 n.1 (2003). 
 101. Harris v. Giant Eagle, 133 F. App’x 288, 297 (6th Cir. 2005). 
 102. Aquino v. Honda of Am., 158 F. App’x 667, 675–76 (6th Cir. 2005). 
 103. Wright v. Murray Guard, Inc., 455 F.3d 702, 712 (6th Cir. 2006). 
 104. Id. at 712 n.4. 
 105. Id. 
 106. See id. 
 107. See id. at 704, 716. 
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concurring opinion undertake a thorough review of the frameworks in other 
circuits, but it also clearly articulated how the Sixth Circuit should respond to 
Desert Palace on the issue of summary judgment frameworks for 
circumstantial mixed-motive claims.108  Judge Moore’s opinion prefigured the 
majority holding in White v. Baxter and formed the backbone of that decision, 
which this Comment examines next.109  Most of the essential points from 
Judge Moore’s Wright concurrence reappear in the White opinion.110 
B. White v. Baxter: The Motivating Factor Framework Is Born 
In 2005, a pharmaceutical salesman named Todd White filed suit against 
his employer, Baxter Healthcare Corporation, for violations of Title VII and a 
Michigan state statute, the Elliot-Larsen Civil Rights Act.111  He alleged 
employment discrimination based on his male gender and African–American 
race.112  This discrimination was supposedly shown by (1) Baxter’s refusal to 
promote White to a sales manager position, (2) the downgrading of his sales 
performance and a consequent diminution of his 2004 raise, and (3) a denial of 
company benefits.113  After the district court granted Baxter’s motions for 
summary judgment, White appealed but abandoned the gender discrimination 
claim and the challenge to lost benefits.114  Furthermore, White’s challenge of 
the refusal-to-promote was grounded on a single-motive theory.115  
Consequently, when the Sixth Circuit reviewed the grant of summary 
judgment, the only mixed-motive theory before it was the salary-reduction 
challenge, accompanied by the following facts.116 
To evaluate employees in 2004, Baxter had set up a table (“the Grid”) 
categorizing various products and the degree of success salespersons would 
need in each product area to earn a “passing” grade.117  Salespersons would 
receive a salary raise commensurate with their level of performance; those at 
the very bottom would receive no raise at all.118  Previously, White had 
achieved outstanding performance reviews in his six years with Baxter, but in 
 
 108. Wright, 455 F.3d at 716–20 (Moore, J., concurring). 
 109. See White v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 533 F.3d 381, 397–402 (6th Cir. 2008). 
 110. However, the White opinion lacks some relevant criticisms articulated in Wright.  See 
infra text accompanying notes 144–149. 
 111. White, 533 F.3d at 385, 389. 
 112. Id. at 389. 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. 
 115. See id. at 390. 
 116. See White, 533 F.3d at 395. 
 117. Id. at 387–88.  Baxter organized the results of the evaluations along a spectrum.  At the 
top was “Exceeds,” followed by “Meets [Expectations] Plus,” “Meets,” “Meets Minus,” and 
“Does Not Meet.”  Id. 
 118. Id. at 388. 
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2004, White’s regional manager (Phillips) found that White’s sales 
performance deserved the lowest score on the Grid, though he raised the final 
grade by one rank, supposedly in acknowledgment of White’s past superior 
performance.119  As a result, Baxter did raise White’s salary in 2004, but the 
increase was smaller than it would have been if White had scored higher on the 
Grid.120  A plain reading of the Grid revealed that White’s performance should 
have placed him in the intermediate grade: one rank above the grade awarded 
him by Phillips.121  On the other hand, Baxter had set additional goals for 
White and certain other salespersons to increase sales of a specific drug, and 
White had concededly failed to meet those added goals.122 
Still, White introduced evidence that the Grid was a more recent standard 
than the personalized goals and should have overridden the latter, as well as 
evidence that other employees were evaluated under the Grid’s terms only.123  
Furthermore, White had produced evidence that Phillips had made disparaging 
remarks about black male employees.124  Phillips had also sent an email to 
multiple employees, containing an off-color joke which connected Osama bin 
Laden to O.J. Simpson.125 
With these facts, the Sixth Circuit had to decide whether Baxter had been 
entitled to summary judgment on White’s mixed-motive theory.126  The court 
reversed the grant of summary judgment.127  First, from Phillips’s behavior, the 
court found a reasonable jury could have inferred discriminatory animus.128  
Second, given that employees other than White had apparently been evaluated 
under the Grid’s standards alone (and not with additional goals in mind), the 
court found a reasonable jury could conclude Phillips’s rating choice was 
motivated at least in part by his discriminatory animus.129 
Most importantly for this Comment’s purposes, the court finally selected 
its post-Desert Palace framework for circumstantial mixed-motive claims at 
summary judgment.130  After another extensive review of the various 
frameworks followed by other circuits, the Sixth Circuit validated Judge 
Moore’s concurrence from Wright by holding that “the McDonnell 
Douglas/Burdine burden-shifting framework does not apply to the summary 
 
 119. Id. at 385–86, 388. 
 120. Id. at 389. 
 121. See White, 533 F.3d. at 388. 
 122. See id. at 387–88. 
 123. See id. at 405. 
 124. Id. at 385. 
 125. Id. 
 126. See White, 533 F.3d at 390. 
 127. Id. at 406. 
 128. Id. at 404. 
 129. Id. at 405–06. 
 130. Id. at 400. 
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judgment analysis of Title VII mixed-motive claims.”131  Rather, “[T]o survive 
a defendant’s motion for summary judgment, a Title VII plaintiff asserting a 
mixed-motive claim need only produce evidence sufficient to convince a jury 
that: (1) the defendant took an adverse employment action against the plaintiff; 
and (2) ‘race, color, religion, sex, or national origin was a motivating 
factor . . . .’”132 
The court naturally focused part of its discussion on the Supreme Court’s 
interpretation of § 2000e-2(m) in Desert Palace.133  With the distinction 
between direct and circumstantial evidence erased for mixed-motive cases, the 
Sixth Circuit saw no cause to withhold the “motivating factor” standard 
inherent to § 2000e-2(m) from plaintiffs whose claims were supported by 
circumstantial evidence, rather than direct evidence.134  After all, the pure 
motivating factor framework had always been applicable to claims based on 
direct evidence.135  Following Desert Palace, the rationale for segregating 
frameworks had vanished along with the distinction between direct and 
circumstantial evidence.136 
Moreover, the Sixth Circuit was concerned that McDonnell Douglas was 
ill-suited for  mixed-motive claims.137  The pretext framework’s purpose, as 
identified by the Supreme Court in Burdine, was “‘to bring litigants and the 
court . . . to [the] ultimate question’ of whether the defendant intentionally 
discriminated against the plaintiff.”138  That purpose was accomplished “by 
‘smok[ing] out the single, ultimate reason for the adverse employment 
decision.’”139 
As the Sixth Circuit understood, a mixed-motive theory by nature never 
requires smoking out a single, ultimate reason.140  Once a mixed-motive 
plaintiff has brought evidence of an illegitimate motivating factor, the plaintiff 
 
 131. White, 533 F.3d at 400. 
 132. Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m)). 
 133. Id. 
 134. Id. 
 135. See id. at 397. 
 136. See White, 533 F.3d at 400. 
 137. Id. at 400–01. 
 138. Id. at 400 (quoting Texas Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1980)). 
 139. Id. (quoting Wright v. Murray Guard, 455 F.3d 702, 720 (6th Cir. 2006)); see also supra 
note 35 and accompanying text. 
 140. This point echoes Justice Brennan’s opinion in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 
228, 247 (1989), superseded by statute, Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 
1074, as recognized in Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244 (1994).  He argued that 
“[w]here a decision was the product of a mixture of legitimate and illegitimate motives . . . it 
simply makes no sense to ask whether the legitimate reason was the ‘true reason’  for the 
decision—which is the question asked by Burdine.”  Id. (citation omitted).  Or as one 
commentator put it, “The [McDonnell Douglas/Burdine] scheme was born out of the notion that 
Title VII cases required proof of but-for, or sole-factor, causation.”  Klein, supra note 25, at 1182. 
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has no responsibility to eliminate the employer’s proffered legitimate reason 
for the adverse employment decision, because no amount of legitimate reasons 
can entirely offset the illegitimate motivating factor.141  At most, legitimate 
reasons may afford the defendant a limited affirmative defense, which the 
defendant is burdened with establishing.142  As the Sixth Circuit concluded, the 
plaintiff should not be saddled with the pretext framework and the added 
burden of rebutting a proffered legitimate reason.143 
C. Post-White: What the Sixth Circuit Missed 
If the White opinion suffered any particular weakness, it was the court’s 
failure to expressly reiterate Judge Moore’s observation in Wright that the 
pretext framework might unjustly terminate some mixed-motive claims at 
summary judgment.144  Instead, the court mostly spoke of McDonnell Douglas 
as “not needed” and “unnecessary.”145  The opinion also left a small role for 
McDonnell Douglas to play in mixed-motive cases.146  The court observed that 
plaintiffs might wish to use part of the McDonnell Douglas prima face case 
(the first step in the burden-shifting process).147 
For all that, the court still emphasized that “compliance with the 
McDonnell Douglas/Burdine shifting burdens of production is not 
required . . . .”148  Under these circumstances, the court added, summary 
judgment would typically be inappropriate because inquiries into an 
employer’s motivations are “very fact intensive.”149 
 
 141. See supra notes 61–62 and accompanying text. 
 142. See supra note 31 and accompanying text. 
 143. White v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 533 F.3d 381, 401 (6th Cir. 2008). 
 144. Wright v. Murray Guard, 455 F.3d 702, 717 (6th Cir. 2006).  These are the same 
concerns critics of the Eighth Circuit have voiced.  See supra notes 74–83 and accompanying 
text. 
 145. White, 533 F.3d at 400–01. 
 146. Id. at 400 n.10.  As an aside, the court observed that McDonnell Douglas was still the 
appropriate framework for single-motive claims (i.e., claims proceeding under 42 U.S.C. § 
2000e-2(a)(1) when based on circumstantial evidence).  Id. 
 147. Id. at 401.  Normally, establishing the prima facie case in the pretext framework creates a 
presumption of discriminatory animus unless the defendant offers a legitimate reason for its 
conduct.  Id. at 400–01.  But it is not entirely clear from the White opinion whether a  
§ 2000e-2(m) plaintiff who chose to invoke and establish the prima facie case from McDonnell 
Douglas would still be able to benefit from this presumption.  In a more recent case from the 
Sixth Circuit, the court did not expressly mention any presumption but acknowledged “[t]he fact 
that [the plaintiff] has established a prima facie case under the McDonnell Douglas framework 
can be considered in favor of his mixed-motive claims.”  Graham v. Best Buy Stores, L.P., 298 F. 
App’x 487, 495 (6th Cir. 2008). 
 148. White, 533 F.3d at 401. 
 149. Id. at 402. 
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Possibly, a second deficiency in the court’s opinion is that it ignored the 
question of how the choice of theories (mixed or single) is made and when that 
choice must be made.  While it may seem to be a mechanical issue, the 
labeling of a claim as proceeding under § 2000e-2(m) or § 2000e-2(a)(1) is 
important because it determines which framework the court should employ at 
summary judgment.150  Ideally, plaintiffs should identify the theory in the 
complaint or at least in any briefs filed in opposition to the defendant’s motion 
for summary judgment.151  They could also discuss the issue at a pretrial 
conference.152  These practical precautions would ensure that trial courts apply 
the motivating factor framework whenever a plaintiff intends to proceed under 
§ 2000e-2(m). 
IV.  CHOOSING A FRAMEWORK: EMPIRICAL SUPPORT FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT 
This section adds support for the Sixth Circuit’s motivating factor 
framework, with special attention paid to empirical evidence.  As some 
scholars have put it, “[When] legal doctrines rely on stated or unstated theories 
about the nature of real world phenomena . . . those theories should remain 
consistent with advances in relevant fields of empirical inquiry.”153  The 
evidence will show that the motivating factor framework fits the facts of 
discrimination just as well as it fits the text and function of § 2000e-2(m). 
A. Multiple Motivations and Empirical Reality 
In Price Waterhouse, Justice Brennan’s plurality opinion explained that an 
employer’s adverse decision is discriminatory if the plaintiff’s protected status 
consciously influences the employer’s decision, to the point that the employer 
would state at the moment of decision (if asked and if honest) that the 
protected status was a reason for its decision.154  Apparently, the plurality 
thought that illegal discrimination had to play a calculated role in the 
employer’s decision, a notion that has been perpetuated with every rote 
 
 150. The court in Hernandez v. Earth Tech, Inc., 2008 WL 4104366, at *1 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 
29, 2008) drove this point home for the plaintiff when it refused to apply the motivating factor 
framework from White v. Baxter, because the plaintiff had “never advanced a mixed-motive 
theory of recovery in any of his submissions [to the court].” 
 151. Pursuant to FED. R. CIV. P. 56. 
 152. See FED. R. CIV. P. 16(c)(2)(A). 
 153. Linda Hamilton Krieger & Susan T. Fiske, Behavioral Realism in Employment 
Discrimination Law: Implicit Bias and Disparate Treatment, 94 CAL. L. REV. 997, 1001 (2006); 
see also Elizabeth M. Schneider, The Dangers of Summary Judgment: Gender and Federal Civil 
Litigation, 59 RUTGERS L. REV. 705, 776 (2007) (“More social science and expert testimony 
could illuminate the interrelationship of fact and law in gender [discrimination] cases.”). 
 154. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 250 (1989) (plurality opinion). 
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recitation of the “ultimate question” in disparate treatment cases.155  Whether 
as a result of the Supreme Court’s view of discrimination or for other reasons, 
unconscious discrimination has tended to escape judicial scrutiny under Title 
VII.156 
Yet, social-psychological research has shown that illegitimate 
discrimination can flourish at a less-than-conscious level in the workplace.157  
According to such research, recognizing discrimination only when it is blatant 
and overt “ignores how discrimination actually works in many situations and 
leaves much discrimination untouched.”158  To detect discrimination, an 
observer must understand that an employer’s illegitimate motivation may 
consist of a preexisting “biased mental state.”159  Illegitimate discrimination in 
the form of, for example, racial bias may be more implicit than explicit, and 
focusing solely on overt forms of intent will cause courts to overlook a great 
deal of discrimination.160  This is not to say that acts of discrimination in such 
cases are necessarily unintentional.  As one social psychologist has explained: 
“[P]eople probably can help it when they stereotype and prejudge. . . .  
Because perceivers have options available, they may be said to intend the one 
they choose.”161 
Based on the empirical data regarding the nature of discrimination, one can 
draw certain conclusions about multiple motivations.  When discrimination 
consists of stereotypes, in part, and operates beneath the level of purposeful 
intent, it follows that other motivations must also play a part in these 
discriminatory decisions, so that the actor’s conduct appears at first blush to be 
 
 155. That is, the question of whether the employer intentionally discriminated for an 
illegitimate reason.  See e.g., Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 143 
(2000). 
 156. Franita Tolson, The Boundaries of Litigating Unconscious Discrimination: Firm-Based 
Remedies in Response to a Hostile Judiciary, 33 DEL. J. CORP. L. 347, 347 (2008) (“While 
unconscious discrimination is actionable under Title VII (presumably), scholars are in agreement 
that court regulation of it has failed.”).  But not all courts have ignored the issue.  See, e.g., 
Thomas v. Eastman Kodak Co., 183 F.3d 38, 58 (1st Cir. 1999) (holding that racial 
discrimination in employee evaluations was illegitimate “regardless of whether the employer 
consciously intended to base the evaluations on race, or simply did so because of unthinking 
stereotypes or bias.”). 
 157. See Tolson, supra note 156, at 356 (“The persistence of unconscious discrimination in 
the workplace has been documented in numerous studies.”). 
 158. Ivan E. Bodensteiner, The Implications of Psychological Research Related to 
Unconscious Discrimination and Implicit Bias in Proving Intentional Discrimination, 73 MO. L. 
REV. 83, 99 (2008) (applying social cognition theory to Title VII and other antidiscrimination 
statutes). 
 159. Krieger & Fiske, supra note 153, at 1056–57. 
 160. Russell K. Robinson, Perceptual Segregation, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1093, 1128 (2008). 
 161. Susan T. Fiske, Examining the Role of Intent: Toward Understanding Its Role in 
Stereotyping and Prejudice, in UNINTENDED THOUGHT: THE LIMITS OF AWARENESS 253, 277 
(James S. Uleman & John A. Bargh eds., 1989). 
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motivated solely by legitimate reasons residing closer to the surface of his 
cognition.  That is to say, the type of submerged discrimination that is left 
untouched by conventional legal wisdom must be accompanied by reasons that 
appear legitimate, in order to be less than blatant and overt.162  Superficially 
legitimate motivations for adverse employment decisions are logically the only 
means by which biased mental states163 can operate while remaining 
undetected. 
The psychological theory of aversive (i.e., subtle) racism illustrates this 
reasoning: 
[A]versive racists will not discriminate when ‘the appropriate decision is 
obvious,’ such as where a candidate for a position is clearly qualified or not 
qualified; however, where the appropriate decision is not clear “because of 
ambiguous evidence about . . . the candidate’s qualifications . . . bias is 
expected.”  In the latter situation, “the aversive racist can justify or rationalize 
a negative response on the basis of some factor other than race.”164 
In the aversive racism scenario, the candidate’s ambiguous qualifications 
would potentially be a legitimate (albeit superficial) motivating factor for an 
adverse employment decision, while the aversive racism itself would be an 
illegitimate motivating factor. 
Overall, these types of theories suggest that multiple motivations are at 
work in many illegitimate discriminatory decisions, including adverse 
employment decisions.  While that would not be true of every case, decisions 
openly motivated by discrimination are relatively rare, as previously noted.165  
Most of the time, courts and parties must deal with subtler forms of alleged 
discrimination.  And it is here that multiple motives likely flourish.166 
B. The Need for a “Motivating Factor” Framework 
The situation described in the preceding section is plainly well-suited for 
an application of § 2000e-2(m).167  Yet, in order for the statute to function 
properly—in order for the law to counter intentional discrimination 
effectively—frameworks in conflict with the reality of multiple motivations 
cannot be permitted to smother the plaintiff’s claim at summary judgment.  
 
 162. See supra note 155 and accompanying text. 
 163. See supra note 156 and accompanying text. 
 164. Bodensteiner, supra note 158, at 101–02 (quoting John F. Dovidio et al., Contemporary 
Racial Bias: When Good People Do Bad Things, in THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF GOOD AND 
EVIL 141, 145, 148 (Arthur G. Miller ed., 2004)). 
 165. See supra note 3 and accompanying text. 
 166. Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Intuitive Psychologist Behind the Bench: Models of Gender 
Bias in Social Psychology and Employment Discrimination Law, 60 J. SOC. ISSUES 835, 846 
(2004) (“[I]t is reasonable to expect that most subtle discrimination cases will be mixed motive 
cases.”). 
 167. See supra note 160 and accompanying text. 
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Instead, courts should choose a framework that comports with the complexity 
of discrimination.168 
The motivating factor framework selected by the Sixth Circuit draws 
directly from the language of the statute and thus avoids impeding or cutting 
off valid claims at summary judgment.169  Conversely, as discussed in Parts II 
and III, the pretext frameworks used by most other circuits clash with a plain 
reading of § 2000e-2(m)170 and unrealistically presuppose a single, 
discriminatory motive, which, in reality, is less prevalent than an intermingling 
of legitimate and illegitimate biases.171  By following the Sixth Circuit’s lead, 
courts can avoid the “endless confusion”172 of issues engendered by the pretext 
frameworks and also ensure that they are allowing § 2000e-2(m) to combat 
unlawful discrimination, even discrimination that might lurk beneath legitimate 
motivations. 
Ideally, social-psychological research will not only reach lawyers and the 
courts, but also permeate society’s understanding of discrimination.173  As 
plaintiffs and their attorneys become more aware of how discrimination works, 
they may be expected to ground their complaints more frequently in § 2000e-
2(m).174  In these cases, courts should follow the trend set by the Sixth Circuit 
and use a motivating factor framework, because it alone is capable of weeding 
out any illegitimate motivation, even when that motivation is intermingled with 
ostensibly lawful reasons for the adverse employment decision.  Subtle or 
 
 168. Significant progress in combating discrimination could be made if “proof schemes 
developed by the courts [are] revisited and modified to reflect the current understanding [of 
discrimination]” in the social sciences.  Bodensteiner, supra note 158, at 127. 
 169. See supra note 131 and accompanying text. 
 170. See supra notes 55–63, 74–80, 134–40, and accompanying text. 
 171. See Bodensteiner, supra note 158, at 103. 
 172. Davis, supra note 45, at 705; see also Krieger, supra note 166, at 838 (noting the 
profound consequences of differing pretext frameworks provided by the Seventh Circuit and 
Supreme Court). 
 173. Of course, the nature of discrimination is not perfectly clear yet.  See Rachel F. Moran, 
The Elusive Nature of Discrimination, 55 STAN. L. REV. 2365, 2418 (2003) (book review) 
(admitting “it is hard to say precisely what discrimination means.”).  However, the very theories 
discussed in this article show that knowledge of discrimination is growing, and modern 
educational institutions can pass that knowledge on to society at large.  See, e.g., NATIONAL 
EDUCATION ASSOCIATION, SOCIAL JUSTICE: STRATEGIES, http://www.nea.org/tools/18848.htm 
(last visited June 8, 2010) (urging educators—of which it claims 3.2 million as members—to 
“[u]nderstand the mechanisms that perpetuate oppression”). 
 174. Long before White v. Baxter, Congress seems to have believed § 2000e-2(m) would 
prove popular amongst plaintiffs.  In its explanation for why the Civil Rights Act of 1991 was 
needed, the House of Representatives agreed with the Justice Department that “virtually every 
Title VII disparate treatment case will to some degree entail multiple motives.”  H.R. REP. No. 
102-40(I), at 47 (1991) as reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 549, 585. 
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otherwise, no form of illegitimate employment discrimination should evade  
§ 2000e-2(m).175 
C. Why Some Courts Overlook Empirical Research 
Regrettably, courts often overlook the results of empirical research 
concerning the nature of bias and discrimination.176  The absence of such 
considerations in most of the preceding cases is telling.  Even the Sixth 
Circuit’s opinion in White v. Baxter is devoid of social–psychological studies 
or concern for how the various frameworks might be more or less preferable 
from a social sciences perspective.  Instead, it concentrates exclusively on 
narrow legal analysis of the Desert Palace and McDonnell Douglas 
frameworks.177  Yet, if § 2000e-2(m) is to work properly, it is vital for courts 
to make empirically informed decisions about which summary judgment 
framework to utilize.  They cannot do so if they ignore what the social sciences 
have to say about discriminatory behavior. 
One possible difficulty is that many judges fail to capture the “insider” 
perspective on discrimination.178  Comfortable with their own perceptions of 
reality and with purely legal concepts of discrimination, they may see little 
need to rely on the social sciences.  Yet, if judges were made aware (perhaps 
by plaintiffs)179 of advances in the social sciences, they would be able to detect 
the subtler strands of discrimination in employers’ behavior, mixed in with 
whatever legitimate reasons the employer may offer for an adverse 
employment decision.  That would be a patent improvement for claims under  
§ 2000e-2(m) at summary judgment, where judges must apply the frameworks 
analyzed in this Comment. 
 
 175. After all, § 2000e-2(m) was designed to catch forms of discrimination that had 
previously escaped sanction under Price Waterhouse.  See supra note 28 and accompanying text.  
One of the “primary purposes” of § 2000e-2(m) was “to provide more effective deterrence.”  H.R. 
REP. No. 102-40(I), at 1 (1991), as reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 549, 552. 
 176. See Bodensteiner, supra note 158, at 99 (“[M]ost reported decisions addressing proof of 
discrimination do not address theories of human behavior . . . .”); Krieger, supra note 166, at 835 
(likewise asserting that “courts do not appear to be cognizant of recent advances in cognitive 
social psychology”).  However, plaintiffs can still sometimes put expert socio-psychological 
testimony to good use.  In Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 235 (1989), the Supreme 
Court acknowledged and discussed the social-psychological trial testimony of Dr. Fiske.  See 
generally Susan T. Fiske et al., Social Science Research on Trial: Use of Sex Stereotyping 
Research in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 46 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 1049 (1991). 
 177. See White v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 533 F.3d 381, 400 (6th Cir. 2008). 
 178. Robinson, supra note 160, at 1157 (explaining that the phenomenon of perceptual 
segregation “pits the plaintiff’s subjective perception against the judge’s own subjective 
perception, and the law privileges the latter”). 
 179. See supra notes 170–71 and accompanying text. 
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CONCLUSION 
As a social phenomenon, discrimination is still widespread, but part of the 
solution may be as simple as adjusting the types of frameworks courts use at 
summary judgment in employment discrimination cases.  Specifically, in cases 
brought under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m), courts should use a motivating factor 
framework, not only because the framework conforms to Supreme Court 
precedent in Desert Palace, but also because it “fits the facts” of 
discrimination.180  The motivating factor framework is essential to the proper 
application of the statute, and in light of the prevalence of multiple motivations 
and the volume of claims that may be based on § 2000e-2(m) following 
decisions like White v. Baxter, it is all the more critical for courts to choose the 
right framework at summary judgment. 
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